Verse 3.9.28 (1):
तान्हैतैः श्लोकैः पप्रच्छ—
यथा वृक्शो वनस्पतिस्तथैव पुरुषोऽमृषा ॥
तस्य लोमानि पर्णानि, त्वगस्योत्पाटिका बहिः ॥ १ ॥tānhaitaiḥ ślokaiḥ papraccha—
yathā vṛkśo vanaspatistathaiva puruṣo’mṛṣā ||
tasya lomāni parṇāni, tvagasyotpāṭikā bahiḥ || 1 ||28. He asked them through these verses:
(1) As a large tree, so indeed is a man. (This is) true. His hair is its leaves, his skin its outer bark.
When the Brāhmaṇas were silent, he asked them through the following verses: As in the world is a large tree —the word ‘Vanaspati’ qualifies the word ‘tree’— so indeed is a man. This is true. His hair is its leaves: A man’s hair corresponds to the leaves of a tree. His skin is its outer bark.
Verse 3.9.28 (2):
त्वच एवास्य रुधिरं प्रस्यन्दि त्वच उत्पटः ॥
तस्मात्तदतृण्णात्प्रैति रसो वृक्शादिवाहतात् ॥ २ ॥tvaca evāsya rudhiraṃ prasyandi tvaca utpaṭaḥ ||
tasmāttadatṛṇṇātpraiti raso vṛkśādivāhatāt || 2 ||(2) It is from his skin that blood flows, and from the bark sap. Therefore when a man is wounded, blood flows, as sap from a tree that is injured.
It is from a man’s skin that blood flows, and it is from the bark of a large tree that sap exudes. Since a man and a large tree thus resemble each other in all respects, therefore when a man is wounded, blood flows, as sap from a tree that is injured or cut.
Verse 3.9.28 (3):
मांसान्यस्य शकराणि, किनाट्ं स्नाव, तत्स्थिरम् ॥
अस्थीन्यन्तरतो दारूणि मज्जा मज्जोपमा कृता ॥ ३ ॥māṃsānyasya śakarāṇi, kināṭṃ snāva, tatsthiram ||
asthīnyantarato dārūṇi majjā majjopamā kṛtā || 3 ||(3) His flesh is its inner bark, and his sinews its innermost layer of bark; it is tough. His bones lie under, as does its wood; his marrow is comparable to its pith.
Similarly a man’s flesh is the inner bark of a large tree. A man’s sinews are the innermost layer of bark in a tree, that layer which is under the inner bark and attached to the wood; it is tough, or strong, like the sinews. A man’s bones lie under the sinews; similarly under the innermost bark is the wood. A man’s marrow is comparable to the pith of a large tree. There is no difference between the two; they resemble each other.
Verse 3.9.28 (4):
यद्वृक्शो वृक्णो रोहति मूलान्नवतरः पुनः ॥
मर्त्यः स्विन्मृत्युना वृक्णः कस्मान्मूलात्प्ररोहति ॥ ४ ॥yadvṛkśo vṛkṇo rohati mūlānnavataraḥ punaḥ ||
martyaḥ svinmṛtyunā vṛkṇaḥ kasmānmūlātprarohati || 4 ||(4) If a tree, after it is felled, springs again from its root in a newer form, from what root does man spring forth after he is cut off by death?
If a tree, after it is felled, springs again from its root in a newer form, etc. We have seen that previous to this feature there was complete similarity between a tree and a man. We notice, however, this peculiarity in a tree that it springs again after it is felled, while we do not see that a man cut off by death springs forth again. But there must be a renascence from some source. Therefore I ask you, from what root does man spring forth after he is cut off by death? In other words, whence is a dead man reborn?
Verse 3.9.28 (5):
रेतस इति मा वोचत, जीवतस्तत्प्रजायते ॥
धानारुह इव वै वृक्शोऽञ्जसा प्रेत्य सम्भवः ॥ ५ ॥retasa iti mā vocata, jīvatastatprajāyate ||
dhānāruha iva vai vṛkśo’ñjasā pretya sambhavaḥ || 5 ||(5) Do not say, ‘From the seed,’ (for) it is produced in a living man. A tree springs also from the seed; after it is dead it certainly springs again (from the seed as well).
If you say that he springs from the seed, do not say (ṣo), you should not say so. Why? Because the seed is produced in a living man, not in a dead man. A tree springs also from the seed, not from the trunk only.—The particle ‘iva’ is expletive.—A large tree, after it is dead, certainly sprīngs again from the seed as well.
Verse 3.9.28 (6):
यत्समूलमावृहेयुर्वृक्शं न पुनराभवेत् ॥
मर्त्यः स्विन्मृत्युना वृक्णः कस्मान्मूलात्प्ररोहति ॥ ६ ॥yatsamūlamāvṛheyurvṛkśaṃ na punarābhavet ||
martyaḥ svinmṛtyunā vṛkṇaḥ kasmānmūlātprarohati || 6 ||(6) If a tree is pulled out with its root, it no more sprouts, From what root does a mortal spring forth after he is cut off by death?
If a tree is pulled out with its root or its seed, it no more sprouts. Therefore I ask you about the root of the whole universe: From what root does a mortal spring forth after he is cut off by death?
Verse 3.9.28 (7):
जात एव; न, जायते, को न्वेनं जनयेत्पुनः ॥
विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म, रातिर्दातुः परायणम्,
तिष्ठमानस्य तद्विद इति ॥ ७ ॥ २८ ॥
इति नवमं ब्राह्मणम् ॥ इति तृतीयो’ध्यायः ॥jāta eva; na, jāyate, ko nvenaṃ janayetpunaḥ ||
vijñānamānandaṃ brahma, rātirdātuḥ parāyaṇam,
tiṣṭhamānasya tadvida iti || 7 || 28 ||
iti navamaṃ brāhmaṇam || iti tṛtīyo’dhyāyaḥ ||(7) If you think he is ever born, I say, no, he is again born. Now who should again bring him forth?—Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman, the supreme goal of the distributor of wealth as well as of him who has realised Brahman and lives in It.
If you think he is ever born. and there is nothing more to ask about him—a question about birth is possible only of one who is yet to be born, and not of one who is already born; but a man is ever born, so no question about his birth is admissible —I say, no. What happens then? After death he is again born of a certainty, for otherwise you would be assuming that a man reaps the fruits of actions that he has never done, and fails to obtain those of actions he has actually done. So I ask you, who should again bring him, the dead man, forth?
The Brāhmaṇas did not know that: that root of the universe out of which the dead man is again born was unknown to them. Hence, being the best of the knowers of Brahman, Yājñavalkya defeated the Brāh-manas and took away the cows. The story is finished. The Śruti in its own form now tells us of the root of the universe, about which Yājñavalkya asked the Brāhmaṇas, and gives the words that directly describe Brahman: Knowledge, or Pure Intelligence, which is also Bliss, not smitten with pain like sense-perception, but serene, beneficent, matchless, spontaneous, ever content and homogeneous. What is that? Brahman, which has both the characteristics (Knowledge and Bliss). The supreme goal, or the bestower of the fruits ot actions, of the distributor of wealth. i.e. of the sacrificer who engages in rites—the word ‘Rāti’ (wealth) has a possessive force— as well as the supreme goal of him who has realised Brahman and lives in It, having renounced all desires and doing no (ritualistic) work.
Here is something to discuss. The word ‘bliss’ is generally known to denote pleasure; and here we find the word ‘bliss’ used as an epithet of Brahman in the expression ‘Bliss, Brahman.’ Elsewhere in the Śrutis too we have: ‘He knew bliss to be Brahman’ (Tai. III. 6), ‘Knowing the bliss of Brahman’ (Tai. II. 7), ‘If this Supreme Self were not bliss’ (Tai. II. 7), ‘That which is infinite is bliss’ (Ch. VII. xxiii. 1), ‘This is its supreme bliss,’ etc. (IV. iii. 32). The word ‘bliss’ is also commonly known to refer to pleasure that is cognised. The use of the word ‘bliss’ in the above quotations would be justified if the bliss of Brahman be an object of cognition. It may be urged: On the authority of the Śrutis, Brahman is bliss that is cognised; so what is there to discuss? The reply is: Not so, for we notice Śruti texts that are contradictory. It is true that in the Śrutis the word ‘bliss’ refers to Brahman; but there is also the negation of knowledge when there is oneness. For example: ‘But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one see and through what,.. what should one know and through what?’ (II. vi. 14; IV. v. 15), ‘Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, knows nothing else, that is the infinite’ (Ch. VII. xxiv. 1), ‘Being fully embraced by the Supreme Self, he knows neither anything outside of himself,’ etc. (IV. iii. 21). Therefore on account of the contradictory Śruti texts a discussion is necessary. Hence we should discuss in order to ascertain the true meaning of the Vedic passages. Moreover, there is a divergence of opinion among the advocates of liberation. The Sāṃkhya and Vaiáeṣika schools, for instance, while believing in liberation, hold that there is no joy to be cognised in it, thus differing from others, who maintain that there is surpassing joy in it, known only to the person concerned.
Now what is the correct position?
Prima facie view: There is joy to be cognised in liberation, for the Śrutis mention bliss etc. with regard to it, as in the following passages: ‘Laughing (or eating), playing and enjoying’ (Ch. VIII. xii. 3), ‘If he desires to attain the world of the Manes, (by his mere wish they appear)’ (Ch. VIII. ii. 1), ‘That which knows things in a general and particular way’ (Mu. I. i. 9 and XI. ii. 7), ‘Enjoys all desires,’ etc. (Tai. II. v. i).
Objection: But is not knowledge impossible when there is oneness, since the different factors of an action are then absent? Every action depends on a number of factors, and cognition too is an action.
Tentative answer: The objection does not hold. On the authority of the Śrutis we must admit that there is knowledge of the bliss of Brahman. We have already said that such Śruti texts as, ‘Knowledge, Bliss,’ etc., would be meaningless if the bliss itself were incapable of being cognised.
Objection: But even a scriptural text cannot make fire cold or water hot, for these texts are merely informative. They cannot tell us that in some other country fire is cold, or that in some inaccessible country water is hot.
Tentative answer: Not so, for we observe bliss and knowledge in the individual self. Texts such as, ‘Knowledge, Bliss,’ etc., do not convey a meaning that clashes with perception and other means of knowledge, as for instance the sentence, ‘Fire is cold,’ does. On the contrary, we feel their agreement with them. One directly knows the self to be blissful, as when one feels, ‘I am happy.’ So the agreement in question with perception etc. is quite clear. Therefore Brahman, which is bliss, being knowledge as well, knows Itself. Thus would the śruti texts cited above, viz. ‘Laughing (or eating), playing, enjoying,’ etc., which prove the existence of bliss in the Self, be found to be consistent.
Advaitin’s reply: You are wrong, for there can be no knowledge in the absence of the body and organs. Absolute separation from the body is liberation, and when there is no body there can be no organs, for they will havç no support. Hence too there will be na knowledge, there being no body and organs. If knowledge cduld arise even in the absence of the body and organs, there would be no necessity for any one to possess them. Moreover (if Brahman as Knowledge Absolute cognises the bliss in liberation), it will contradict the oneness of Brahman.[17]
Objection: Suppose we say that the Supreme Brahman, being eternal Knowledge, ever knows Itself as Bliss Absolute?
Reply: No, (this has just been answered). Even the man under bondage, when freed from relative existence, would regain his real nature (Brahman). (So the same argument would apply to him also.) Like a quantity of water thrown into a tank, he does, not retain a separate existence so as to know the blissful Brahman. Hence, to say that the liberated man knows the blissful Self is meaningless. If, on the other hand, the liberated man, being different from Brahman, knows the bliss of Brahman and the individual self as, ‘I am the Bliss Absolute,’ then the oneness of Brahman is contradicted, which would be against all Śrutis; and there is no third alternative. Moreover, if Brahman ever knows Its own bliss, it is superfluous to distinguish between awareness and unawareness. If It is constantly aware of this bliss, then that is Its nature; hence there is no sense in maintaining that It cognises Its own bliss. Such a view would be tenable if ever there was the possibility of Its not knowing that bliss, as for instance a man knows himself and another (by an act of will). There is certainly no sense in distinguishing between a state of awareness and one of unawareness in the case of a man whose mind is uninterruptedly absorbed in an arrow, for instance. If, on the other hand, Brahman or the Self is supposed to be knowing Its bliss interruptedly, then in the intervals when It does not cognise Itself, It must know something else[18]; and the Self would become changeful, which would make It non-permanent. Hence the text, ‘Knowledge, Bliss,’ etc., must be interpreted as setting forth the nature of Brahman, and not signifying that the bliss of the Self is cognised.
Objection If this bliss is not cognised, such Śruti texts as ‘Laughing (or eating), playing/ etc., will be contradicted.
Reply: No, for such texts only describe actions happening normally, because of the identity of the liberated man with all (infinite existence). That is to say, since the liberated man is identified with all, therefore wherever we observe the laughing etc.—in the Yogins or in the gods—the Śrutis merely describe them as they are with regard to the liberated man, simply on account of his identity with all. It is but a eulogy on liberation, which is synonymous with such identity.
Objection: If those passages merely describe what happens normally, then there is the chance of the liberated man’s being affected by misery also. If, in other words, he partakes of the laughing etc., happening normally to the Yogins and others, he may also suffer the misery that (plants and other) stationary existences experience.
Reply: No, all these objections have already (p. 306) been refuted on the ground that the distinctions of happiness, misery, etc., are but superimposed by the delusion created by contact with the limiting adjuncts, the body and organs, which are the products of name and form. We have also stated the respective spheres. of the apparently contradictory Śruti texts (p. 393). Hence all passages containing the word ‘bliss’ should be interpreted like the sentence, ‘This is its supreme bliss’ (IV. iii. 32).