तस्मान्न जायते चित्तं चित्तदृश्यं न जायते ।
तस्य पश्यन्ति ये जातिं खे वै पश्यन्ति ते पदम् ॥ २८ ॥tasmānna jāyate cittaṃ cittadṛśyaṃ na jāyate |
tasya paśyanti ye jātiṃ khe vai paśyanti te padam || 28 ||28. Therefore neither the mind nor the objects perceived by the mind are ever born. Those who perceive such birth may as well discover the foot-prints (of the birds) in the sky.
Shankara Bhashya (commentary)
The verses of the Kārikā from 25 to 27 give the views of a class of Buddhistic thinkers, known as the Vijñānavādins1 (the subjective idealists) who thus refute the views of those who maintáin the reality of external objects. The2 Advaitic teacher (Gauḍapāda) approves of these arguments. Now he makes use of these very arguments of the Vijñānavādins as the ground (middle term) for refuting the conclusions of the subjective idealists. The Kārikā has this end in view. The subjective idealist admits that the mind, even in the absence of the (external) jar, etc., takes the form of the jar, etc. We also agree with this conclusion because this is in conformity with the real nature of things. In like manner, the mind, though never produced, appears to be produced and cognised as such. Therefore the mind is never produced, as is the case with the object cognised by it. The Vijñānavādins who affirm the production of the mind and also assert that the mind is momentary, full of pain, non-Self in nature, etc., forget that the real3 nature of the mind can never be understood by the mind fas described by them). Thus the Vijñānavādins who see the production of the mind resemble those who (profess to) see in the sky foot-prints left by birds, etc. In other words, the Vijñānavādins are more audacious than the others, viz., the dualists. And the Nihilists4 who, in spite of the perception of the visible world, assert the absolute non-existence of everything including their own experiences, ate even mote audacious than the Vijñānavādins. These Nihilists take the position of those who claim to compress the whole sky in the palms of their hands.
Anandagiri Tika (glossary)
The three Kārikās, viz., 25, 26 and 27, give the views of the Buddhist idealist who refutes those that believe in the reality of the external objects. This Kārikā refutes the position of the Vijñāna-vādin.
1 Vijñānavādins—They belong to the school of subjective idealism in the Buddhistic system of thought. According to this school, all objects are pre-existent in the subject in the form of Vāsanās (ideas). Cause is only a subjective idea. It does not exist as external object with which we associate it. Further, according to this school, all ideas are momentary.
2 The Advaiīa, etc.—Gaucjapāda accepts the views of the Vijñānavādins only in respect of the non-existence of external objects. He also agrees with the Vijñānavādins that the so-called external objects are nothing but the state of the mind (cittaspandanam).
3 Real nature, etc.—It is because the mind, according to the Vijñānavādins, is momentary. The consciousness of one moment is unrelated to that of the next moment. Such being the case, in the absence of an unchanging entity it is not possible to know the change of consciousness from one moment to another. Therefore it is absurd to assert that the mind is born every moment and that it is full of misery, etc. For, there is no perceiver according to the Vijñānavādins, which can cognize this momentary change of consciousness as well as its painful and non -Ātman character.
4 Nihilists—The position of the Nihilists who affirm the nonexistence of everything, including the perceiver, is even more untenable. If all that exists is really a void, then there must be a perceiver of this void. Otherwise who will assert that everything, is void?