अत्र पितापिता भवति, मातामाता, लोका अलोकाः, देवा अदेवाः, वेदा अवेदाः । अत्र स्तेनोऽस्तेनो भवति, भ्रूणहाभ्रूणहा, चाण्डालोऽचण्डालः, पौल्कसोऽपौल्कसः, श्रमणोऽश्रमणः,; तापसोऽतापसः, अनन्वागतं पुण्येनानन्वागतं पापेन, तीर्णो हि तदा सर्वाञ्छोकान्हृदयस्य भवति ॥ २२ ॥
atra pitāpitā bhavati, mātāmātā, lokā alokāḥ, devā adevāḥ, vedā avedāḥ । atra steno’steno bhavati, bhrūṇahābhrūṇahā, cāṇḍālo’caṇḍālaḥ, paulkaso’paulkasaḥ, śramaṇo’śramaṇaḥ,; tāpaso’tāpasaḥ, ananvāgataṃ puṇyenānanvāgataṃ pāpena, tīrṇo hi tadā sarvāñchokānhṛdayasya bhavati || 22 ||
22. In this state a father is no father, a mother no mother, the worlds no worlds, the gods no gods, the Vedas no Vedas. In this state a thief is no thief, the killer of a noble Brāhmaṇa no killer, a Caṇḍāla no Caṇḍāla, a Pulkasa no Pulkasa, a monk no monk, a hermit no hermit. (This form of his) is untouched by good work and untouched by evil work, for he is then beyond all the woes of his heart (intellect).
It has been said that the self-effulgent Ātman which is being described is free from ignorance, desire and work, for it is unattached, while they are adventitious. Here an objection is raised: The Śruti has said that although the self is Pure Intelligence, it does not know anything (in the state of profound sleep) on account of its attaining unity, as in the case of a couple in each other’s embrace. The Śruti has thereby practically said that like desire, work, etc., the self-effulgence of the Ātman is not its nature, since it is not perceived in the state of profound sleep. This objection is refuted by a reference to the illustration of the couple in each other’s embrace, and it is asserted that the self-effulgence is certainly present in profound sleep, but it is not, perceived on account of unity; it is not adventitious like desire, work, etc. Having mentioned this incidentally, the text takes up the topic under discussion, viz. that the form of the self that is directly perceived in the state of profound sleep is free from ignorance, desire and work. So it is a statement of fact to describe this form as beyond all relations. Since in the state of profound sleep the self has a form that is ‘beyond desires, free from evils and fearless,’ therefore in this state a father is no father. His fatherhood towards the son, as being the begetter, is due to an action, from which he is dissociated in this state. Therefore the father, notwithstanding the fact of his being such, is no father, because he is entirely free from the action that relates him to the son. Similarly we understand by implication that the son also ceases to be a son to his father, for the relation of both is based on an action, and he is beyond it then, since it has been said, ‘Free from evils’ (IV. iii. 21).
Likewise a mother is no mother, the worlds, which are either won or to be won through rites, are no worlds, owing to his dissociation from those rites. Similarly the gods, who are a part of the rites, are no gods, because he transcends his relation to those rites. The Vedas also, consisting of the Brāhmaṇas, which describe the means, the goal and their relation, as well as the Mantras, and forming part of the rites, since they deal with them, whether already read or yet to be read, are connected with a man through those rites. Since he transcends those rites, the Vedas too then are no Vedas.
Not only is the man beyond his relation to his good actions, but he is also untouched by his terribly evil actions. So the text says: In this state a thief, one who has stolen a Brāhmaṇa’s gold—we know this from his mention along with one who has killed a noble Brāhmaṇa—is free from this dire action, for which he is called a thief, a despicable sinner. Similarly the killer of a noble Brāhmaṇa is no killer. Likewise a Caṇḍāla, etc. Not only is a man free from the actions done by him in his present life, but he is also free from those dire actions of his past life that degrade him to an exceedingly low birth. A Caṇḍāla is one born of a Śūdra father and a Brāhmaṇa mother.—‘Caṇḍāla’ is but a variant of the same word.—Not being connected with the work that caused his low birth, he is no Caṇḍāla. A Pulkasa is one born of a Śūdra father and a Kṣatriya mother.—‘Paulkasa’ is a variant of the same word.—He too is no Pulkasa. Similarly a man is dissociated from the duties of his particular order of life. For instance, a monk is no monk, being free from the duties that make him one. Likewise a hermit or recluse is no hermit. The two orders mentioned are suggestive of all the castes, orders, and so on.
In short, (this form of his) is untouched by good work, rites enjoined by the scriptures, as well as by evil work, the omission to perform such rites, and the doing of forbidden acts. The word ‘untouched’ is in the neuter gender as it qualifies ‘form,’ the ‘fearless form’ of the preceding paragraph. What is the reason of its being untouched by them? The reason is being stated: For he, the self of a nature described above, is then beyond all the woes, or desires. It is these desires for wished-for things that in their absence are converted into woes. A man who has either failed to attaSn those things or lost them keeps thinking of their good qualities and suffers. Hence woe, attachment and desire are synonyms. (The clause therefore means:) Because in the state of profound sleep he transcends all desires; for it has been said, ‘He craves no desires’ (IV. iii. 21), and ‘Beyond desires.’ Coming in the wake of those terms, the word ‘woe’ ought to mean desires. Desires again are the root of action; it will be stated later on, ‘What it desires, it resolves; and what it resolves, it works out’ (IV. iv. 5). Therefore, since he transcends all desires, it has been well said, ‘It is untouched by good work,’ etc.
Of his heart: The heart is the lotus-shaped lump of fle3h, but being the seat of the internal organ, intellect, it refers to that by a metonymy, as when we speak of cries from the chairs (meaning persons occupying them). The woes of his heart, or intellect—for, they abide there, since it has been said, ‘Desire, resolve, (etc. are but the mind)’ (I. v. 3). It will also be said later on, ‘The desires that dwell in his heart’ (IV. iv. 7). This and the other statement about ‘the woes of his heart’ repudiate the error that they dwell in the self, for it has been said that being ṇo more related to the heart in the state of profound sleep, the self transcends the forms of death. Therefore it is quite appropriate to say that being no more related to the heart, it transcends the relation to desires abiding in the heart.
Those who maintain that the desires and impressions dwelling in the heart go farther and affect the self, which is related to it, and even when it is dissociated from the self, they dwell in the latter, like the scent of flowers etc. in the oil in which they have been boiled, can find no meaning whatsoever for such scriptural statements as, ‘Desire, resolve,’ ‘It is on the heart (mind) that colours rest’ (III. ix. 20), ‘The woes of his heart,’ etc.
Objection: They are referred to the intellect merely because they are produced through this organ.
Reply: No, for they are specified in the words, ‘(That) dwell in (his) heart.’ This and the other statement, ‘It is on the heart that colours rest,’ would hardly be consistent if the intellect were merely the instrument of their production. Since the purity of the self is the meaning intended to be conveyed, the statement that desires abide in the intellect is truly appropriate. It admits of no other interpretation, for the Śruti says, ‘It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were’ (IV. iii. 7).
Objection: The specification about ‘desires that dwell in his heart’ implies that there are others that dwell in the self too.
Reply: No, for it demarcates these desires from those that are not then in the heart. In other words, the epithet ‘that dwell in his heart’ contrasts not this particular seat of desires with some other seats, but contrasts these desires with those that are not in the heart at the time. For instance, those that have not yet sprung up—the future ones—or those that are past, having been checked by contrary ideas, are surely not in the intellect; and yet they may crop up in future. Hence the specification in contradistinction to them is quite in order, meaning those desires regarding some object that have sprung up and are present in the intellect.
Objection: Still the specification would be redundant.
Reply: No, because more attention should be paid to them as objects to be shunned. Otherwise, by ascribing the desires to the self, you would be holding a view which is contrary to the wording of the Śruti and is undesirable.
Objection: But does not the negation of a fact of normal experience in the passage, ‘He craves no desires’ (IV. iii. 19), mean that the Śruti mentions the desires as being in the self?
Reply: No, for the experience in question about the self being the seat of desires is due to an extraneous agency (the intellect), as is evidenced by the Śruti passage, ‘Being identified with dreams through its association with the intellect’ (IV. iii. 7). Besides there is the statementsabout the self being unattached, which would be incongruous if the self were the seat of desires; we have already said that attachment is desire.
Reply: No, that passage only means the absence of any other object of desire than the self.
Objection: Does not the reasoning of the Vaiśeṣika and other systems support the view that the self is the seat of desires etc.?
Reply: No; the arguments of the Vaiśeṣika and other systems are to be disregarded, since they contradict specific statements of the Śrutis such as, ‘(That) dwell in (his) heart’ (IV. iv. 7). Any reasoning that contradicts the Śrutis is a fallacy. Moreover, the selfeffulgence of the Ātman is contradicted. That is to say, since in the dream state desires etc. are witnessed by Pure Intelligence only, the views in question would contradict the self-effulgence of the Ātman, which is stated as a fact by the Śrutis and is also borne out by reason; for if the desires etc. inhere in the self, they cannot again be its objects, just as the eye cannot see its own particulars. The self-effulgence of the witness, the self, has been proved on the ground that objects are different entities from the subject. This would be contradicted if the self be supposed to be the seat of desires etc. Besides it contradicts the teachings of all scriptures. If the individual self be conceived as a part of the Supreme Self and possessing desires etc., the meaning of all the scriptures would be set at naught. We have explained this at length in the second chapter (p. 300). In order to establish the meaning of the scriptures that the individual self is identical with the Supreme Self, the idea that it is the seat of desires etc. must be refuted with the greatest care. If, however, that view is put forward, the very meaning of the scriptures would be contradicted. Just as the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas, holding that wish and so forth are attributes of the self, are in disharmony with the ṛneaning of the Upaniṣads, so also is this view not to be entertained, because it contradicts the meaning of the Upaniṣads.
It has been said that the self does not see (in the state of profound sleep) on account of unity, as in the case of the couple, and that it is self-effulgent. Selfeffulgence is being Pure Intelligence by nature. Now the question is, if this intelligence is the very nature of the self, like the heat etc. of fire, how should it, in spite of the unity, give up its nature, and fail to.know? And if it does not give up its nature, how is it that it does not see in the state of profound sleep? It is self-contradictory to say that intelligence is the nature of the self and, again, that it does not know. The answer is, it is not self-contradictory; both these are possible. How?—