नैकस्मिन्न्, असंभवात् ॥ ३३ ॥
naikasminn, asaṃbhavāt || 33 ||
na—not; ekasmin—in one; asaṃbhavāt—on account of the impossibility.
33. On account of the impossibility (of contrary attributes) in one and the same thing (the Jaina doctrine is) not (true).
After the refutation of the Bauddhas the Jaina doctrine is taken up for discussion and refutation. The Jainas acknowledge seven categories, which can be mainly divided intö two groups, the soul and the non-soul. Again they predicate seven different views as regards the reality of everything. Everything according to them may be real, unreal, both real and unreal, different from real and unreal, indescribable, and so ön. Now this view about things cannot be accepted, as it is absurd to think of the same thing as endowed with these contradictory attributes of reality, unreality, etc. According to the Jaina doctrine we cannot arrive at any certain knowledge, and this world, heaven, and even Freedom will become doubtful. According to Vedantic view, however, the world is Anirvachaniya, unspeakable, and so fit for all relative purposes.